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ALL MEN ARE (OR SHOULD BE) CREATED EQUAL:
AN ARGUMENT AGAINST THE USE OF THE CULTURAL
DEFENSE IN A POST-BOOKER WORLD
Elizabeth Martin*
INTRODUCTION
"[N]o question exists that the Booker-Fanfan decision will have a monumental
impact on the sentencing process."' After nearly two decades under the highly-
systematic Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the federal criminal justice system was
turned upside down in 2005 by the Supreme Court's holdings in the combined
decision of United States v. Booker and United States v. Fanfan.2 This decision ren-
dered the previously mandatory Guidelines merely "advisory" and opened the flood-
gates for judicial discretion in sentencing. Although academics generally applaud
the decision,4 the post-Booker system allows judges to consider factors relevant to
the individual defendant which are not specifically allowed for in the Guidelines.
One such factor is the culture of the defendant.
This Note will argue that a defendant's cultural background should never be
taken into account in determining federal sentences, particularly in light of the recent
Booker decision. Part L.A will discuss the cultural defense, its uses in sentencing,
and the policy arguments against its use. Part I.B highlights a sample of cases where
the cultural defense was successfully raised. Part I.A looks at the history and the ap-
plication of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Part I.B explains the circuit split over
* J.D., William & Mary Law School, 2007. This Note is dedicated to Professor James
Eisenstein of Penn State-my college mentor, teacher, and friend. I would also like to thank
my fianc6 Ryan and my family for their love and support.
' Robert J. Anello & Jodi Misher Peikin, Evolving Roles in Federal Sentencing: The Post-
Booker/Fanfan World, 2005 FED. CTs. L. REV. 9, 32, available at http://www.fclr.org/articles/
2005fedctslrev9.pdf.
2 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (holding the Guidelines unconstitutional
as written). This Note will refer to the combined Booker/Fanfan decisions as the "Booker"
decision.
3 Id. at 245-46.
4 See, e.g., Anello & Peikin, supra note 1, at 56-57 ("In many ways, the post-Booker!
Fanfan world of sentencing is the best of both worlds-a more perfect system. While sentenc-
ing courts have regained some of the discretion lost to the Guidelines, this discretion is not
unfettered or without checks."). But see Craig Green, Booker and Fanfan: The Untimely Death
(and Rebirth?) of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 93 GEO. L.J. 395,425 (2005) (arguing
"that the flaw in Booker and Fanfan is not just that those decisions disrupted critical activities
of a coordinate branch (though they certainly did); the problem is that the Court undertook
such disruption without articulating any coherent, principled explanation").
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the acceptance of the cultural defense by examining the six federal appeals cases that
rule on the application of the cultural defense to federal sentences. Part II.C discusses
the Booker decision and the judicial and academic reactions to the ruling. Part fl.D
briefly looks at the lone federal appeals case ruling on the cultural defense in sentenc-
ing since Booker. The Conclusion explains why the cultural defense should not be
allowed in federal sentencing, particularly in the post-Booker world, and examines the
potential impact on the cultural defense of the four proposals recently put before the
Sentencing Commission to reform the federal sentencing structure. Finally, it is rec-
ommended that Congress take action through the Sentencing Commission to explic-
itly forbid the use of the cultural defense, regardless of which of the new sentencing
regimes is implemented.
I. CULTURAL DEFENSE
A. Introduction
1. Cultural Defense Defined
When members of ethnic or indigenous groups are charged with breaking the
law, on occasion they will ask the court to consider their cultural background in judg-
ing their conduct.6 In general, however, courts do not consider the "culture" of a defen-
dant, and instead make an effort "to apply an equal standard of justice to all people."7
There are scholars and judges who disagree with this approach and argue that
cultural backgrounds should be considered in the criminal justice system.
The term "cultural defense" broadly refers to judges considering "the cultural
background of litigants in the disposition of cases before them."9 Though it can be
' See United States v. Ruiz-Alonso, 397 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2005).
6 ALISON DuNDEs RENTELN, THE CULTURAL DEFENSE 5 (2004).
7 Kelly Diffily, Comment, PROTECTing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Look at
Congress' Prohibition of Cultural Differences in Federal Sentencing Determinations in The
Wake of The 2003 PROTECT Act, 78 TEMP. L. REv. 255, 258 (2005) (citing Kay L. Levine,
Negotiating the Boundaries of Crime and Culture: A Sociolegal Perspective on Cultural
Defense Strategies, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 39, 40 (2003)).
' See, e.g., United States v. Guzman, 236 F.3d 830, 834-39 (7th Cir. 2001) (Ripple, J.,
dissenting in part); United States v. Yu, 954 F.2d 951,955-60 (3rd Cir. 1992) (Becker, J., dis-
senting), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1048 (1993); RENTELN, supra note 6, at 6 (advocating the use
of the cultural defense because "justice requires looking at the context of individuals' actions");
Kelly M. Neff, Note, Removing the Blinders in Federal Sentencing: Cultural Difference as
a Proper Departure Ground, 78 CHi.-KENTL. REv. 445,468 (2003) (arguing for cultural dif-
ference as a legitimate ground for departure under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
9 RENTELN, supra note 6, at 5. For an interesting argument concerning the teaching of
the cultural defense in the criminal law classroom, see Susan S. Kuo, Culture Clash: Teaching
Cultural Defenses in the Criminal Law Classroom, 48 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1297, 1299 (2004)
("To provide some perspective on this apparent perspectivelessness, I incorporate the issue
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used in civil cases,' ° the cultural defense is usually raised in criminal cases. " While
most frequently used in homicide cases, the defense is aslo raised in criminal pros-
ecutions for crimes such as "animal cruelty, arson, bribery, hunting out of season,
narcotics offenses, [and] sexual assault."' 12 The cultural defense is raised at all stages
of the legal process, such as arrest, prosecution, plea bargaining, defense, and sen-
tencing. 13 This Note focuses specifically on the use of the cultural defense in the
sentencing phase of criminal prosecutions.
2. Cultural Issues in Sentencing
Arguments in favor of the use of cultural defenses consider the moral culpability
of the defendant's actions and the effect that the defendant's background has upon his
actions. 14 Based upon these rationales, defense counsel typically raise the cultural
defense in five broad areas of sentencing: "criminal behavior accepted or expected in
the defendant's culture," "stronger cultural motive for the crime," "additional punish-
ment from the defendant's community," "immigration consequences," and the "defen-
dant's unusual behavior at sentencing."' 5 These types of arguments are raised both
as a stand-alone defense in an attempt to gain an acquittal and as a mitigating factor
in sentencing.16
Much of the discussion of the "criminal behavior accepted or expected in the de-
fendant' s culture" surrounds the notions of honor and shame in traditional Asian cul-
ture and the effect that these notions have upon the defendant's motives. 17 Similarly,
of the cultural defense in my Criminal Law course.... My hope is that, by addressing this
matter, my students will learn to recognize the cultural assumptions imbedded in the cases they
are reading and gain a deeper understanding of the law.").
'0 For a discussion of the use of the cultural defense in civil cases, see RENTELN, supra
note 6, at 201-10.
Id. at6-7.
12 Id. at 6.
13 Id. at 7.
"4 Marcia G. Shein, Cultural Issues in Sentencing, in CULTURAL ISSUES IN CRIMINAL
DEFENSE § 12.1(a) (James G. Connell III & Rene L. Valladares eds., 2003).
'5 Id. § 12.1(b)-(f).
16 For arguments concerning the allowance of a defendant's cultural circumstances as a
mitigating factor in sentencing, see Elaine M. Chiu, Culture as Justification, Not Excuse, 43
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1317, 1374 (2006) (arguing for the shift in the orientation of thinking of
the cultural defense from an excuse to a mitigating factor in sentencing); Damian W. Sikora,
Note, Differing Cultures, Differing Culpabilities?: A Sensible Alternative: Using Cultural
Circumstances as a Mitigating Factor in Sentencing, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1695 (2001) (con-
cluding that it is against the interests of fairness and equity to enact a stand-alone cultural
defense proposing instead that a defendant's cultural circumstances should be allowed to
serve as a mitigating factor in sentencing).
17 See Shein, supra note 14, § 12.1(b) (discussing People v. Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Mar. 21, 1989), and noting the court ordered probation after finding that "the defendant's
[Chinese] cultural premium on honor led him to kill his wife"); see also People v. Aphaylath,
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defense attorneys have argued for the use of the cultural defense because of the
effect that cultural backgrounds have on their clients' motives for crime. 8 A third
argument raised by defense counsel is that courts should give certain defendants lesser
sentences because the defendants' cultures have traditional methods to administer
punishment in addition to those imposed by the courts. 9 Criminal defense attorneys
also argue for reduced sentences when there are immigration consequences for crim-
inal defendants facing deportation. 20 Finally, arguments have been made to consider
the defendant's cultural background because of his "unusual behavior at sentencing,"
such as not showing remorse for committing the crime.2
3. Policy Arguments Against the Cultural Defense
There are a number of public policy reasons against the use of the cultural de-
fense in federal sentencing. First, although evidence of the individual defendant's
cultural background may lessen his sentence, the evidence may ultimately have an
adverse effect on the cultural community.22 This type of treatment tends to perpetuate
502 N.E.2d 998,999-1000 (N.Y. 1986) (finding error where a trial court refused to consider
that a Laotian refugee's murder of his wife was the result of extreme emotional disturbance
because under Laotian culture his wife's affections towards another man would have
triggered sufficient shame to murder).
18 See Shein, supra note 14, § 12.1(c) (citing People v. Kimura, No. A-091133 (Cal. Super.
Ct. L.A. County, Nov. 21, 1985) (reducing the defendant's charge to voluntary manslaughter
after the defense presented evidence that the defendant, a Japanese immigrant who killed her
two children by drowning them in an attempted parent-child suicide, did so to avoid what
would have been an unacceptable social situation in Japan)). For further discussion of the
Kimura case, see Alison Matsumoto, Comment, A Place for Consideration of Culture in the
American Criminal Justice System: Japanese Law and the Kimura Case, 4 J. INT'L L. &
PRAc. 507 (1995).
"9 Shein, supra note 14, § 12.1(d); see also United States v. Fulton, 987 F.2d 631, 632
(9th Cir. 1993) (considering whether a S'Klallam Indian should receive a lesser sentence
because his tribe needed to "enforce its culturally based sexual abuse program").
20 Shein, supra note 14, § 12.1(e); see also United States v. Ortega-Mendoza, 981 F.
Supp. 694, 696 (D.D.C. 1997) (granting the defendant a downward departure because his
status as a deportable alien disqualified him from early release programs and from being
assigned to a minimum security prison).
2 Shein, supra note 14, § 12.1(0; see also People v. Superior Court ex rel. Soun Ja Du,
7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177, 181 (Ct. App. 1992) (discussing the trial court's grant of a probationary
sentence after defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter because the defendant's fail-
ure to show remorse likely resulted from cultural and language barriers). For further discussion
of the role of language and cultural barriers in criminal proceedings, see Richard W. Cole &
Laura Maslow-Armand, The Role of Counsel and the Courts in Addressing Foreign Language
and Cultural Barriers at Different Stages of a Criminal Proceeding, 19 W. NEW ENG. L.
REv. 193, 226-28 (1997).
22 Diffily, supra note 7, at 283.
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stereotypes that foreign-born Americans are not held to the same legal standard as
"Americans" and unfairly groups people of a particular culture together.
23
Second, the consideration of sentencing factors indirectly asks judges to accept
a defendant's violent actions because the violence was acceptable within his cultural
community.24 This is particularly true in domestic abuse cases, in which the female
victim will likely suffer more as a result of the man's lessened sentence.25 The use
of the cultural defense in these cases perpetuates the feeling that these victims have
little recourse in American courts and leads to further victimization.26 Furthermore,
by reducing sentences based on cultural backgrounds, the courts are lessening the im-
portance of the very freedoms that many immigrant victims, particularly women, come
to this country to enjoy.
Conversely, a similar argument can be raised in cases in which female defendants
are the ones being sentenced, 27 as in United States v. Natal-Rivera,28 United States v.
Contreras,29 and United States v. Guzman.' If these defendants are able to successfully
argue for a downward departure based on arguments of a patriarchal culture, a man
from that culture could similarly argue that his culture allows for domestic abuse.3'
"Finally, and perhaps most importantly," determining what is and is not the result
of the defendant's culture "is a difficult, if not impossible, task. 32 Cultural beliefs
may not be uniform throughout a society, and they may differ from those within a
cultural community in the United States and abroad.33 In any case, if the cultural de-
fense is accepted for foreign-born Americans, similar arguments could be raised for
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. For an argument that gender-related issues are legitimate sentencing factors, see
Myrna S. Raeder, Gender-Related Issues in a Post-Booker Federal Guidelines World, 37
MCGEORGE L. REv. 691 (2006).
26 Raeder, supra note 25.
27 Diffily, supra note 7, at 284. For further discussion of the implications of the cultural
defense on sexual discrimination, see Gila Stopler, Countenancing the Oppression of Women:
How Liberals Tolerate Religious and Cultural Practices that Discriminate Against Women,
12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 154, 221 (2003) ("Keeping in mind that it was not so long ago that
religion and culture played a major role in justifying racial, ethnic, and religious oppression
that has now become unacceptable, it is high time that liberals start to question what has now
become the inseparable link between respecting religious and cultural practices and counte-
nancing the oppression of women.").
28 879 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1989) (discussed infra Part II.B.1).
29 180 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 904 (1999) (discussed infra Part
II.B.2).
30 236 F.3d 830 (7th Cir. 2001) (discussed infra Part H,B.4).
3" Diffily, supra note 7, at 284.
32 Id.
33 Id.
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accepting that a defendant's neighborhood, family, or gang membership has an effect
on his criminal action and is reason for a downward departure.34
Arguments in favor of the cultural defense also raise questions of practicality and
application: When exactly does an individual become assimilated into American
culture to an extent that culture may no longer be considered? Is it based on time?
Employment? Language skills? Age at the time of immigration? Place of residence?
Extent of behavior? 35 Then there is the question of the amount of the departure:
Could that be quantified as well? Federal sentences are determined by a point-based
sentencing rubric.36 Do we want to add and subtract sentencing points based upon
the defendant's assimilation to society?37 In essence the problem is this: do we want
to punish foreign-born Americans for learning English or becoming an active member
of the workforce? In addition to the philosophical arguments against the cultural de-
fense, these weaknesses in its practical application strengthen the argument against
its use entirely.
B. Examples of the Successful Use of the Cultural Defense
1. People v. Wu
A classic example of the successful use of the cultural defense can be seen in the
California case People v. Wu. 38 In Wu, the defendant challenged her conviction for
the murder of her son and her subsequent prison sentence of fifteen years to life.39 She
argued that the trial court erred in refusing to give two requested jury instructions. 4°
One of these instructions related to the effect that her cultural background may have
had on her state of mind when she killed her son.41
The defense argued that the defendant "was, at the time of the killing, in a
highly overwrought emotional state," and that this state could be explained by refer-
encing the "effect of her cultural background on her perception of the circumstances"
34 Id.
31 Id. at 284-85.
36 See infra Part II.A.
id. at 285.
38 286 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Ct. App. 1991) (depublished). For a detailed argument against the
use of the cultural defense in infanticide cases by Asian immigrants, see Michele Wen Chen
Wu, Comment, Culture is no Defense for Infanticide, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y &
L. 975 (2002-03).
'9 Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 869.
40 Id. at 869-70.
41 Id. at 870. The other argument related to her defense of unconsciousness. Id. at 869-70.
Before ever discussing the cultural defense instruction, the court ruled that the conviction
must be reversed because the unconsciousness instruction was not given despite the existence
of evidence to support such an instruction. Id. at 887.
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preceding her strangling of her son.4 2 The Court of Appeals of California held that the
jury instruction concerning the effect that the defendant's culture had on her state of
mind should have been given because the language of the instruction left the determi-
nation up to the jury: "There is no reason why defendant's requested instruction, sim-
ply pointing out that the jury may consider evidence of her cultural background in
determining the presence or absence of the relevant mental states, should not have
been given. '4 3 Because the trial court gave neither this instruction, nor the unconscious-
ness instruction, the Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's murder conviction. 4
2. People v. Aphaylath
The cultural defense also has been successfully utilized within the framework of
the differing notions of honor in the United States and some foreign nations.45 One
case that dealt with this concept is People v. Aphaylath.46 In Aphaylath, a Laotian
refugee living in the United States was convicted of murdering his wife.47 The defense
argued that the defendant was under extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the
crime because, pursuant to Laotian culture, his wife's receiving phone calls from an
unattached man would "[bring] shame on defendant and his family sufficient to trig-
ger defendant's loss of control."48 The defense also wanted to present testimony of
experts in Laotian culture to support the defense that "stress and disorientation encoun-
tered by Laotian refugees in attempting to assimilate into the American culture" con-
tributed to the defendant's extreme emotional disturbance.4 9 Although the trial court
in Aphaylath refused to allow this expert testimony, the appellate court reversed.5 °
The Court of Appeals held that the expert testimony was admissible in this case to
support the defendant's defense of emotional distress.5
42 Id. at 881. Similar cultural arguments have been raised in other cases of infanticide by
Asian immigrants. See, e.g., Bui v. State, 717 So. 2d 6,20-21 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) (rejecting
the appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because of his counsel's alleged lack
of focus on appellant's cultural background during his trial for infanticide); Matsumoto, supra
note 18, at 524 (discussing People v. Kimura, No. A-091133 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County,
Nov. 21, 1985), in which the defense used cultural evidence to establish that the defendant,
in adhering to the practice of oya-ko shinju, was "mentally disturbed").
41 Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
44 Id. at 887.
4' For a detailed discussion of the cultural issues surrounding different notions on honor
in sentencing, see Shein, supra note 14, § 12.1(b).
46 502 N.E.2d 998 (N.Y. 1986).
41 Id. at 999.
48 Id.
49 Id.
'o Id. at 999-1000.
" Id. at 1000.
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3. State v. Kargar
The cultural defense has been asserted successfully not only in cases of homicide
but also in cases of sexual assault. The defendant in State v. Kargar, an Afghani refu-
gee, was convicted of gross sexual assault after his neighbor viewed him kissing his
eighteen-month-old son's penis." Before the bench trial, the defendant moved for
a dismissal pursuant to Maine's de minimis statute. 3 In the de minimis hearing, the
defense brought forth "testimony from many Afghani people who were familiar with
the Afghani [cultural] practice... of kissing a young son on all parts of his body."54
The trial court rejected the motion and Kargar was convicted. On appeal, the Maine
Supreme Court found that the trial court "erred as a matter of law [in finding] culture,
lack of harm, and his innocent state of mind irrelevant [in] its de minimis analysis. 56
4. United States v. Fulton
The defendant's culture has also been used to argue for sentence reductions when
culturally based methods of dealing with crime may be administered against the defen-
dant.57 In United States v. Fulton,58 the defendant, an S'Klallam Indian, pled guilty
to abusive sexual contact with a twelve-year-old female on an Indian reservation59
52 State v. Kargar, 679 A.2d 81, 82-83 (Me. 1996). For a detailed analysis of Kargar and
its use in the argument against the cultural defense, see Nancy A. Wanderer & Catherine R.
Connors, Culture and Crime: Kargar and the Existing Framework for a Cultural Defense, 47
BUFF. L. REV. 829, 873 (1999) ("Given the safeguards woven into our criminal justice system,
recognition of a formal cultural defense is both unnecessary and potentially harmful to the
very members of our immigrant communities most in need of society's protection-women
and children.").
13 Kargar, 679 A.2d at 83. Maine's de minimis statute provides, in pertinent part:
1. The court may dismiss a prosecution if,... having regard to the nature
of the conduct alleged and the nature of the attendant circumstances,
it finds the defendant's conduct:
A. Was within a customary license or tolerance, which was not expressly
refused by the person whose interest was infringed and which is not incon-
sistent with the purpose of the law defining the crime; or
B. Did not actually cause or threaten the harm sought to be prevented
by the law defining the crime or did so only to an extent too trivial to
warrant the condemnation of conviction; or
C. Presents such other extenuations that it cannot reasonably be regarded
as envisaged by the Legislature in defining the crime.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 12(1) (2006).
" Kargar, 679 A.2d at 83.
55 Id.
56 Id.
5' For further discussion of this doctrine, see Shein, supra note 14, § 12.3(a)-(b).
58 987 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1993).
59 Id. at 632. This conduct violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 2244(a)(3) (2006). Id.
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and was sentenced to twenty-one months imprisonment' under the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines.6' The defendant requested a downward departure at sentencing because,
among other reasons, 62 his tribe needed to "enforce its culturally based sexual abuse
program., 63 The Ninth Circuit declined to rule on the merits of this argument, stat-
ing that "[a] court's discretionary refusal to depart downward is not reviewable on
appeal."'
UI. FEDERAL SENTENCING
A. Pre-Booker
1. History of the Sentencing Guidelines
Prior to 1984, federal district judges had nearly unrestricted power in determining
the length of sentences for convicted criminal defendants.65 Because of this broad dis-
cretion, sentences varied wildly throughout the country.' Congress created the United
States Sentencing Commission (the "Commission") with the Sentencing Reform Act
of 198467 as an independent agency under its supervision to develop guidelines for
federal district judges to use while imposing criminal sentences. 68 After a statute out-
lining the desired construction of the guidelines was passed, the Commission pub-
lished the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual (the "Guidelines") in April of
1987.69 The Guidelines went into effect in November of that year with the intent of
lessening the disparity in the criminal sentencing process across federal jurisdictions.7"
According to the manual, "Congress sought reasonable uniformity in sentencing by
6 This sentence was determined "[flollowing an evidentiary hearing [in which] the district
court determined that Fulton had used force within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2A3.4(a),"
therefore setting his base offense level at sixteen. Fulton, 987 F.2d at 632.
61 Id. For further discussion on cultural issues in crimes committed by Native Americans,
see Stephen D. Easton, Native American Crime Victims Deserve Justice: A Response to Jensen
and Rosenquist, 69 N.D. L. REV. 939 (1993). See also Jon M. Sands, Departure Reform and
Indian Crimes: Reading the Commission's Staff Paper with "Reservations," 9 FED. SENT'G
REP. 144 (1996) (calling for sentencing reform to take into account Native American cases
and defendants).
62 The defense also argued for departures based upon the defendant's age and medical
infirmity. Fulton, 987 F.2d at 633-34.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 634.
65 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363-65,412 (1989) (discussing the history of
federal sentencing and ruling the Federal Sentencing Guidelines constitutional).
66 Id. at 363-65.
67 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3626 (2000); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (2000).
68 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2004).
69 id.
70 Id.
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narrowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed for similar criminal offenses com-
mitted by similar offenders."'" In theory, the Guidelines assured that without any
prior criminal history, a twenty-one-year-old black male in Philadelphia and a sixty-
year-old white female in Kansas would receive an equal or very similar sentence for
an equal crime. Since the Guidelines were issued in 1987, the manual has been
amended nearly every year,7 2 but the purpose of the Guidelines has not changed.
2. Application of the Guidelines
In each criminal case, federal probation officers are the first court officials to use
the Guidelines to determine the appropriate sentence. These individuals use the
Guidelines to create a document known as a "pre-sentencing" report.73 This report
outlines the specifics of the crime and calculates the sentence 74 suggested by the
Sentencing Table in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.7 5 In order to find the sug-
gested sentence, each crime is assigned a base level somewhere between one and
forty-three. 6 Robbery, for example, has a base offense level of twenty.77 From the
base level, federal probation officers in their reports, and later district judges in the
final sentencing, take into consideration the specifics of the offense, such as the defen-
dant's role in the offense and relevant conduct, and adjust the base level accordingly.78
In the case of robbery, the weapon used, the degree of injury to persons, the threats
made, and the losses are all considered in determining the sentencing range.79 Con-
tinuing with this example, if during the act a firearm was displayed but not discharged,
the offense level increases by five.8 If the loss was between $50,000 and $250,000,
the offense level increases by two." Assuming these circumstances, the sentence
designated for this particular crime would be that of a level twenty-seven. 2 In order
to determine the length of the sentence, using the manual's Sentencing Table the
probation officer would follow offense level twenty-seven across the chart and impose
a sentence in the given range based on previous criminal history on a scale of "I"
71 Id.
72 Id.
7' For an in-depth explanation of the role of the federal probation officer and the pre-
sentence report under the Guidelines, see Gary M. Maveal, Federal Presentence Reports:
Multi-Tasking at Sentencing, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 544 (1996).
74 Id. at 557-58.
75 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (2004).
76 Id. (also dividing offenses into four "zones").
77 Id. § 2B3.1.
78 Id. § 1B1.1.
71 Id. § 2B3.1.
80 Id. § 2B3.1(b)(2).
81 Id. § 2B3.1(b)(7).
82 See id. § 2B3.1.
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through 'VI., 83 Therefore, if the robber had no criminal history and had committed
a level twenty-seven crime, he should receive between seventy and eighty-seven
months in federal prison under the Guidelines structure.8 The probation officer would
write these details in the report and then give it to the judge to use in sentencing.
The sentence in a pre-sentence report, however, is not necessarily final. Assuming
that the judge does follow the Guidelines, he or she still has the option of reducing
or increasing the designated sentence while staying within the spirit of the Guide-
lines. Chapter 5, Part K of the manual outlines the grounds under which departures
can be made.86 One of the most common of these departures, outlined in section
5K1.1, is a downward departure known as Substantial Assistance.87 This departure
from the Guidelines, which must be initiated by the U.S. Attorneys' Office, is based
upon information given to authorities by the defendant that assists in the investiga-
tion or prosecution of other crimes.88 Downward departures can also be based upon
grounds such as the victim's conduct, in which case the victim contributed signifi-
cantly to promoting the offensive behavior;89 diminished capacity, whereby the de-
fendant committed a non-violent criminal offense while suffering from "significantly
reduced mental capacity" not resulting from the "voluntary use of drugs or other
intoxicants"; 9° or voluntary disclosure of the offense, in which case the "defendant
voluntarily discloses to authorities" his involvement in the "offense prior to the dis-
covery of such offense."91
B. Pre-Booker Federal Circuit Court Cases which Consider the Cultural Defense
in Sentencing
Much of the discussion in cases addressing the cultural defense revolves around
the interpretation of section 5H 1.10 of the Guidelines: a policy statement regarding
"Race, Sex, National Origin, Creed, Religion and Socio-Economic Status."92 This
provision plainly states that "[t]hese factors are not relevant in the determination of
83 Id. § 5A.
84 Id.
85 Id. § 5K.
86 Id.
87 Id. § 5K.l.
88 id.
89 Id. § 5K2.10.
90 Id. § 5K2.13.
91 Id. § 5K2.16.
92 Id. § 5H1.10. Although not directly relevant to the cultural defense, the interpretation
of section 5K2.0, known as the "catch-all" provision, also has been the subject of much debate.
For a detailed anaylsis of departure grounds under section 5K2.0, see Jennifer L. Cordle, The
Imagination is a Fertile Stomping Ground: Non-Enumerated Grounds for Departure from
the United States Sentencing Guidelines Under § 5K2.0, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 193 (1999).
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a sentence. '93 The question remains, however, whether this provision prohibits the
consideration of "culture" in sentencing.94 The Supreme Court has never ruled on
this issue, and the Sentencing Commission has not clarified the Guideline provision.
Therefore, the only federal appellate court guidance that exists on the interpretation
of the provision is found in the opinions of the circuit courts. Prior to the Booker
decision,95 each of the six federal circuits that ruled on the application of the cultural
defense in sentencing vacated the sentences imposed by the district court.96 The
rationale of these decisions and the interpretation of the sentencing provisions, how-
ever, are inconsistent. Although unresolved, the evolution of this circuit split is essen-
tial in understanding the current state of the cultural defense in the federal system.
1. United States v. Natal-Rivera
In 1989, the Eighth Circuit became the first federal court of appeals to specifi-
cally address the role of the cultural defense in sentencing. In United States v. Natal-
Rivera,97 the defendant appealed her sentence of fifty-one months imprisonment after
pleading guilty to one count of distribution of cocaine.98 After dismissing Natal-
Rivera's delegation and separation of powers arguments, 99 the court addressed the
defense's argument that the Guidelines are unconstitutional because they do not con-
sider the defendant's cultural background.'t°
Last, Natal-Rivera argues that the Sentencing Guidelines are con-
stitutionally infirm because they assertedly do not allow a sentenc-
ing court to consider the defendant's cultural background when
imposing sentence. Historically, a difference in cultural back-
ground has been consistently rejected as an excuse for criminal
activity. It is but a small step from there to conclude that Congress
9' U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.10 (2004).
9 A proponent for the consideration of culture in sentencing has proposed the adoption
of a section 5H1.13 entitled "Cultural Factors" within the Guidelines structure in light of the
vagueness of section 5Hl.10. Matsumoto, supra note 18, at 538.
9' United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
96 United States v. Guzman, 236 F.3d 830 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Contreras, 180
F.3d 1204, 1212 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 904 (1999); United States v. Sprei,
145 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Tomono, 143 F.3d 1401 (1 1th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Yu, 954 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1048 (1993); United
States v. Natal-Rivera, 879 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1989).
97 879 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1989).
" Id. at 392; see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(2), (b)(1) (2000).
99 The Eighth Circuit dismissed this claim by holding that the Supreme Court had already
ruled upon this issue in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,410-11 (1989). Natal-Rivera,
879 F.2d at 392.
'o Natal-Rivera, 879 F.2d at 393.
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may prevent considerations of cultural background from being a
mitigating factor for that criminal activity. We, therefore, reject
Natal-Rivera's argument that the Guidelines violate due process
on this point or that the district court erred in not taking into
account her cultural heritage.' '
This brief holding 10 2 apparently settled the debate on the use of culture in federal
sentencing in the Eighth Circuit, though exceptions have been raised successfully
in several cases involving Native American defendants.0 3
2. United States v. Sprei and United States v. Contreras
Roughly a decade later in the cases of United States v. Sprei'4 and United States
v. Contreras,15 two federal appellate courts specifically ruled that cultural heritage
should be subsumed under the factors expressly excluded as impermissible reasons
for a sentence reduction by section 5H 1.10 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.'06
o ld. (citations omitted).
102 The entire Natal-Rivera opinion is only three pages in the Federal Reporter.
103 Some Eighth Circuit cases have allowed the cultural heritage argument of growing up
on an Indian reservation to be used in sentencing. This exception is made with consideration
of its compatibility with section 5H 1.10 of the Guidelines. The government apparently did
not argue incompatibility in this narrow grouping of cases. See, e.g., United States v. Decora,
177 F.3d 676, 679 (8th Cir. 1999) (upholding a downward departure for a Native American
defendant convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon because of the adversity the defendant
faced on the reservation); United States v. One Star, 9 F.3d 60, 60-61 (8th Cir. 1993) (uphold-
ing a downward departure for a defendant convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon be-
cause of the "unusual mitigating circumstances" of reservation life); United States v. Big Crow,
898 F.2d 1326, 1331-32 (8th Cir. 1990) (affirming a two-level departure for a defendant con-
victed of assault with a dangerous weapon and assault resulting in serious bodily injury because
of, among other things, the defendant's consistent efforts to overcome the adversities of living
on the reservation).
'04 145 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 1998).
'0' 180 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 904 (1999). In her analysis of the
cultural defense in sentencing practices, Kelly Diffily puts Sprei in a separate category from
Natal-Rivera and Contreras. Diffily, supra note 7, at 259-60 & nn.31-32. Diffily groups the
cases in which the "culture serves to justify or explain" the criminal action as the basis for
departure under "Conformity with Culture" and places Natal-Rivera and Contreras in this
category. Id. at 259 & n.3 1. She places Sprei in a category labeled "Cultural Hardship," for
cases in which the defendant's actions have "nothing to do" with culture, but it is argued that
his culture creates a "unique need" for a reduced sentence. Id. at 259-60 & n.32. Although
there are obvious differences in the rationales behind these decisions, they have been treated
similarly in the courts. This Note, therefore, focuses upon the use of culture in sentencing gen-
erally and will not differentiate between these suggested categories.
'06 The Sentencing Commission adopted this guideline to comply with Congress's di-
rection that the guidelines be "entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national origin, creed, and
socio-economic status of offenders." 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (2000).
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In Sprei, the Second Circuit refused to uphold the defendant's lesser sentence
based upon his religious community practices. 0 7 The defendant pled guilty to conspir-
acy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 in a plot to defraud several insurance companies. 10 8
"Both parties agreed not to request a departure from the applicable" Guidelines
range,'09 and the pre-sentence report prepared by the United States Probation Office
did not recommend a departure.1 0 Prior to the sentencing hearing, "the district court
received a downward departure motion" and thirty-seven letters submitted by the de-
fendant's rabbi and the Bobov Community.l"' These letters explained the effect that
the defendant's imprisonment would have on the marriage prospects of his children
in an arranged-marriage culture." 2 Admittedly based upon these letters, thejudge "de-
parted downward six offense levels" and sentenced the defendant to "eighteen months'
of imprisonment with three years of supervised release.., based [upon]... Sprei' s
family circumstances and his history of good works."
'
"
3
On appeal, the government argued that the district court "relied on forbidden
religious and socio-economic grounds, couched as 'family circumstances,' in depart-
ing downward from the Guidelines range."'" 4 The Second Circuit agreed, stating:
[T]o the extent the circumstances of Sprei's children are atypical
because the established marriage practices of the Bobov Hasidic
community place special emphasis on the role of the father, we
agree with the Government that this is an improper basis for de-
parture. Congress has directed that the Sentencing Guidelines
must be "entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national origin, creed,
and socioeconomic status of offenders." By according special
deference to the customs of a particular religious community, the
district court has chosen to treat adherents of one religious sect
more favorably than non-adherents who might also desire to assist
in planning their children's futures."15
'07 Sprei, 145 F.3d at 536.
108 Id. at 530.
109 Id.
o Id. "The [pre-sentence] Report noted that Sprei [was] married and [that he] live[d]
with ... five of his six children... in the Borough Park section of Brooklyn." Id. The report
also explained that the defendant "and his family are members of an Orthodox Jewish sect
known as the 'Bobov Community." ld. ' The Report adopted the application of the Sentencing
Guidelines" specified in the plea agreement and "therefore recommended an offense level
of 21, and a Criminal History Category of I." Id. '"This analysis yield[s] a sentencing range
of thirty-seven to forty-six months." Id.
"' Id. at 531.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 532.
"I Id. at 536 (citations omitted).
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The Second Circuit reversed the sentence and remanded, finding "that the district
court abused its discretion in granting [the defendant] a departure based on his chil-
dren' s [future] marriage prospects." '16
Another circuit court decision that refused to allow cultural heritage to be consid-
ered in sentencing based on section 5H 1.10 of the Guidelines was United States v.
Contreras."7 In Contreras, the Tenth Circuit vacated the defendant's sentence be-
cause of a downward departure based on the defendant's Mexican-American heritage
and Roman Catholic religion." 8 The district judge had given the defendant a sentence
115 months lower than the minimum recommended by the pre-sentence report." 9
The Tenth Circuit directly rejected this rationale based upon section 5H 1.10:
On appeal, in a pro se supplemental brief, Ms. Contreras urges
this court to consider her unusually high susceptibility to her
father's influence due to her culture and religion. Ms. Contreras
explains that "parental subservience is ... fundamental to tradi-
tional Hispanic/Mexican-American culture. Its basis goes beyond
mere cultural norms and principles, however, with its genesis in
the very heart of the Catholic/Christian Religion, specifically in
the 5th Commandment's dictate '[h]onor your father and your
mother'." While we do not doubt the sincerity of Ms. Contreras'
argument, the Sentencing Guidelines prohibit us from considering
race, national origin, creed, and religion."2
The language of the holding therefore suggests not only that this specific defendant's
sentence should not be based upon cultural norms and religion but also that this type
of reduction is prohibited under the Guidelines.
3. United States v. Yu and United States v. Tomono
Prior to the Booker decision, two other circuit courts denied downward departures
on the basis of cultural heritage or religion without explicitly ruling against the prac-
tice in general: United States v. Yu 121 and United States v. Tomono.
122
116 Id.
" 180 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 904 (1999).
118 Id. at 1212 n.4.
19 Id. at 1207. The probation office determined that the defendant's base offense level was
thirty-eight and that her criminal history category was I. Id. Her sentence according to the
Guideline range was therefore assessed at 235 to 293 months imprisonment in the pre-sentence
report. Id.
120 Id. at 1212 n.4 (omissions and alterations in original) (citing U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.10 (2004).
121 954 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1048 (1993).
122 143 F.3d 1401 (llthCir. 1998).
2007] 1319
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
In 1992, the Third Circuit heard United States v. Yu 123 a case in which a native
of Korea pled guilty to two counts of bribery of a public official. The defendant
offered the bribes to the examining agent during an audit of his and his wife's joint tax
return.' 24 The defense asserted the defendant's experience in Korea led him to believe
that it was an insult not to pay an "honorarium" to such an official.' 25 He argued,
therefore, that cultural differences are "distinct from national origin" in the language
of section 5H 1.10 of the Guidelines.
26
In its opinion, the Third Circuit avoided ruling on the question of whether cultural
differences are subsumed by "national origin" within the language of section 5H 1.10
and upheld the sentence, stating that it would have been an abuse of discretion to
depart in this case:
Although the concept of sentencing based upon one's culture
raises a number of questions as to whether differences in culture
within the same society should be, or can be, identified as focal
points for sentencing or whether cultural differences deemed to
be a matter for sentencing consideration should be restricted to
cultures which are foreign to American shores, we leave those
questions to be answered by the Sentencing Commission which
Congress has designated to deal with such issues. Suffice it to
say, this case does not require resolution of "cultural" v. "natural
origin" issues.1
21
Although not an express repudiation or endorsement, this holding suggests that the
use of the cultural defense may be appropriate but leaves the door open for clearer
guidance by the Sentencing Commission. 128
Another pre-Bookerfgderal appeals case to deal with the use of cultural heritage
in sentencing is United States v. Tomono.129 In this case, the Eleventh Circuit vacated
a three-level downward departure and remanded the case as an abuse of discretion.
130
123 954 F.2d at 952. It is worth noting that the defendant had graduated from law school
in Korea and had worked as an attorney at the Korean equivalent of the IRS before
immigrating to the United States. Id. Yu was a naturalized American citizen, and he took
courses at Temple University in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Id. at 952-53. Yu ran a "tax
preparation business" and seemed to be financially successful. Id.
124 Id. at 953.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 954.
128 The dissent in Yu makes a strong argument in favor of the use of the cultural defense
in sentencing. Id. at 955-60 (Becker, J., dissenting); see also supra note 11 and accompany-
ing text.
129 143 F.3d. 1401 (1 1th Cir. 1998).
130 Id. at 1402, 1405.
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The defendant, a Japanese national who operated a commercial reptile import/export
business, brought six illegal snakes into the United States with the intent to sell
them.' 3' Tomono was charged with violations of the anti-smuggling statute'32 and the
Lacey Act. 133 At the sentencing hearing,'" the defendant was granted a three-level
downward departure under section 5K2.0135 based upon "cultural differences between
the United States and Japan," and he was sentenced to five years of probation (un-
supervised provided that he would leave the United States)" and fined $5000.136 The
defense argued that Tomono was "unaware of the.., consequences of his actions"
because of these cultural differences.
37
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the defense's argument and vacated the
sentence. 31 Citing the Third Circuit's Yu decision, the court argued that departing
downward based on the cultural differences in this case comes too close to departing
based upon "national origin," which is expressly forbidden under section 5H 1. 10.139
Following the Third Circuit's lead, the Eleventh Circuit also explicitly declined to
decide whether cultural differences are ever an appropriate reason for departure."4°
131 Id. at 1402.
132 Id. "The anti-smuggling statute makes it a crime to fraudulently or knowingly import
goods contrary to law." Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1994)).
'13 Id. The Lacey Act "forbids the import, export, sale, or possession of fish or wildlife that
has been 'taken, possessed, transported, or sold' in violation of federal, state or foreign law."
Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 3372 (1994)).
134 At the sentencing hearing, the district court found that the base offense
level for a crime involving wildlife is six. See U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Q2. 1(a) (1997). The district court added two
offense levels because the offense involved a commercial purpose, see
id. § 2Q2.1 (b)(1), and five more offense levels because it found that
the market value of the wildlife was more than $40,000, see id.
§ 2Q2. l(b)(3)(A). The district court then subtracted two offense levels
for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in a total offense level of
eleven.
Tomono, 143 F.3d at 1402.
'31 Section 5K2.0 is a policy statement explaining that the Guidelines provide for departures,
upward or downward, under circumstances "not adequately taken into consideration." U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (2006).
136 Tomono, 143 F.3d. at 1403.
137 Id.
131 Id. at 1405.
139 Id. at 1404 n.2. ("We note, as the Third Circuit has, that the Sentencing Commission
has expressly stated that national origin is not relevant as a factor in the determination of a
sentence, and that considering any 'cultural differences' attributable solely to a defendant's
country of origin comes uncomfortably close to considering the defendant's national origin
itself, in contravention of the guidelines." (citations omitted)).
"~ Id. at 1404 n.4. ("We need not decide whether 'cultural differences' may ever be an
appropriate ground upon which to depart from the guidelines.").
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4. United States v. Guzman
The Seventh Circuit was the final circuit court to address cultural issues prior
to the Booker decision. In United States v. Guzman, 4' a Mexican woman was con-
victed of a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine' n The Guidelines range for
the sentence was fifty-seven to seventy-one months in prison.'43 Based upon the
defendant's request for a downward departure because of her cultural heritage and
the pre-sentence report's recommendation,'" "the judge sentenced her to time
served (three days) plus six months of home detention... [and] two and a half years
of supervised release." 1
45
On appeal, the government argued that "cultural heritage can never be [the] basis
[of] a downward departure."' 46 This argument was based on section 5H1.10 of the
Guidelines. 147 Although the Seventh Circuit vacated the defendant's sentence,148 the
court did not hold that the cultural defense is necessarily forbidden under section
5H 1.10 of the Guidelines:
[W]e need not exclude all possibility of consideration of cultural
factors in cases that we cannot yet foresee .... It is enough in
order to decide this case to note that the sentencing judge abused
his discretion in granting this defendant a downward departure
(let alone one of 25 levels) on the basis of her cultural heritage.
What the district judge regarded as a matter of cultural heritage
is just the joinder of gender and national origin, two expressly
forbidden considerations in sentencing. 1
49
141 236 F.3d 830 (7th Cir. 2001).
142 Id. at 831.
143 id.
'44 Id. The pre-sentence report recommended a downward departure for her Mexican heri-
tage. Id. The defendant's role in the conspiracy was to assist her co-conspirator boyfriend, also
a Mexican. Id. The report cited the Mexican cultural norm that "dictated submission to her
boyfriend's will." Id. at 831-32. The report also noted that she had stayed with him, defying
her family, because "she was pregnant with his child yet they were not married." Id. at 832.
14- Id. at 831.
146 Id. at 832.
'41 Id. For the text of this section and its statutory progenitor, see supra note 112.
141 Id. at 834. The court did, however, note that judges are to work to remain within the
framework of the Guidelines.
We further remind that when basing departures on factors not explicitly
considered by the Sentencing Commission, a judge is to strive to remain
within the conceptual universe of the guidelines, moving by analogy
from its explicit provisions and stated objectives to the novel situation
presented by the case before him.
Id.
141 Id. at 833.
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Therefore, although the Seventh Circuit was the last of the federal circuit courts to
address the cultural defense prior to the Booker decision, the Guzman decision did
not resolve the issue. Even by 2005,, at the time of the Booker decision, the appli-
cation of the cultural defense under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines had not been
firmly decided either by the Supreme Court or by a majority of the circuit courts.
C. The Booker Decision
1. The Case
In 2005, the federal criminal justice system was turned upside-down by the
decision in United States v. Booker. 50 In this consolidated case, two defendants had
been convicted on charges relating to cocaine distribution in two separate cases.'
5 1
The first defendant's sentence, imposed under the United States Sentencing Guidelines
regime, was reversed by the Seventh Circuit after the trial judge increased the sen-
tence by more than eight years upon finding that the defendant possessed a greater
quantity of drugs than was found by the jury.'52 In the second defendant's case, the
trial judge declined to apply the Guidelines' enhancement provisions, which would
have added ten years to his sentence, and the government appealed the sentence to
the First Circuit.'53
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in these cases to determine:
(1) "Whether the Sixth Amendment is violated by the imposition of
an enhanced sentence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines
based on the sentencing judge's determination of a fact (other than
a prior conviction) that was not found by the jury or admitted by the
defendant."
(2) "If the answer to the first question is 'yes,' the following question
is presented: whether, in a case in which the Guidelines would require
the court to find a sentence-enhancing fact, the Sentencing Guidelines
as a whole would be inapplicable, as a matter of severability analysis,
such that the sentencing court must exercise its discretion to sentence
the defendant within the maximum and minimum set by statute for
the offense of conviction.
150 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
"5' Id. at 227-28.
152 Id.
113 Id. at 228-29.
114 Id. at 229 n.1.
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In answering these questions, the Supreme Court held that the Apprendi v. New
Jersey 55 and Blakely v. Washington '56 decisions applied to the U.S. Sentencing Guide-
lines. 57 Therefore, the Sixth Amendment requires that any fact, other than a prior
conviction, necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the
facts determined by a jury or a guilty plea must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt
or admitted by the defendant.' s Subsequently, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) was deemed
unconstitutional. '
This decision effectively rendered the United States Sentencing Guidelines ad-
visory rather than mandatory.' 6 Now federal district court judges are instructed to
consider the Guidelines in their sentences but are no longer bound to apply them.'6 '
2. Reaction to Booker
The Court's ruling in Booker has forced federal courts to quickly adapt to a new
system of sentencing. 62 Although the Supreme Court's language in Booker that the
Guidelines should be "considered," along with Congress's oversight of the federal sen-
tencing process, make it likely that courts will "continue to calculate a defendant's
Guideline range, as they have for the past 17 years," the judge is no longer required
' 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires that a jury make the factual determination on a basis of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that authorizes an increase in the maximum prison sentence). For an interesting dis-
cussion of Apprendi and its effect, see Douglas B. Bloom, United States v. Booker and United
States v. Fanfan: The Tireless March ofApprendi and the Intracourt Battle to Save Sentencing
Reform, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 539, 552 (2005) ("While Justice Breyer's preferred
remedy [in Booker] left the Guidelines in the best possible state given Apprendi, its effective
evisceration of Congress's goal of sentencing uniformity highlights the Court's error in
adopting the Apprendi rule in the first place.").
156 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (invalidating petitioner's sentence as a violation of the Sixth
Amendment because the jury's verdict alone did not authorize the sentence and the judge
sentenced above the statutory maximum only upon finding some additional fact).
5 Booker, 543 U.S. at 230-32.
158 Id. at 232. The holdings in the Booker decision are actually the result of two majority
opinions. The first opinion was written by Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Scalia, Souter,
Thomas, and Ginsberg, which held the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional.
Id. at 226-27. The second majority opinion, which Justice Breyer wrote, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsberg, found that the appropriate
remedy was to render the Guidelines "advisory" and to allow appellate court review for
"reasonableness." Id. at 245-46, 261-63. For further analysis of the two majority opinions,
see Green, supra note 4, at 400-14.
"9 Booker, 543 U.S. at 245-46. This is the provision that made the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines mandatory.
'60 Id. at 245.
161 Id. at 246.
162 See Anello & Peikin, supra note 1, at 32.
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to impose that sentence.63 Factors other than those set forth in the Guidelines are
now important in the sentencing determination, although data suggest "that sentenc-
ing judges are likely to remain within the Guidelines ranges in most cases.""'6 Most
relevant to the application of the cultural defense after Booker, defense attorneys are
now able to argue for the consideration of defendants' individual characteristics by
providing that information to the court, even though it is unrelated to the offense
conduct.'65
Although the ground for seeking appellate review was not altered by Booker, the
case did alter circuit courts' review of criminal sentences.' 66 Circuit courts are no
longer forced to reverse sentences that depart from the Guidelines; instead, they now
may review for "reasonableness."' 67 This lessened standard, coupled with the advisory
nature of the guidelines, substantially increases judicial discretion in sentencing and
will likely decrease nationwide federal sentencing uniformity.
61
163 Id. at 31.
," Id. at 34. For evidence that there has been a significant decrease in sentences within
the Guidelines post-Booker, see Susan R. Klein, Shifting Powers in the Federal Courts:
Symposium Issue: The Return of Federal Judicial Discretion in Criminal Sentencing, 39
VAL. U. L. REv. 693, 731 (2005) ("A chart showing all reported decisions between January
12 and March 15, 2005 shows that only 62.1% of the over five-thousand cases were within
Guidelines range. This is a marked decrease over the 71% of sentences that conformed to the
Guidelines in 1995 and the 65% in 2002." (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS REPORT FOR FISCAL YEARS 1995-2002, at tbl. 8; Memorandum
from the Office of Policy Analysis to Judge Hinojosa, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Commission
(Mar. 22, 2005), available at http://www .ussc.gov/Blakely/Booker_032205.pdf,)). This
trend continued throughout the 2005-2006 fiscal year, with only a slight*increase in
Guideline range sentencing to 62.2% from January 12, 2005, to January 11, 2006. U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON
FEDERAL SENTENCING app. D, at 10 (2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/booker-report/
Booker_..Report.pdf.
165 Anello & Peikin, supra note 1, at 32-33.
'66 Id. at 32.
167 Id. "Within approximately a month of deciding Booker/Fanfan, the Supreme Court
issued memorandum opinions in more than 400 cases, granting certiorari, vacating the decision
below, and remanding for further consideration in light of Booker/Fanfan." Rosemary T.
Cakmis, The Role of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in the Wake of United States v.
Booker and United States v. Fanfan, 56 MERCER L. REv. 1131, 1156 (2005).
16' For further discussion of increased judicial discretion post-Booker and an argument in
favor of the advisory nature of the Guidelines, see Sandra D. Jordan, Have We Come Full
Circle? Judicial Sentencing Discretion Revived in Booker and Fanfan, 33 PEPP. L. REv. 615,
616 (2005) ("Judicial discretion is alive and well. After almost twenty years of structured sen-
tencing in federal courts,judicial discretion has been restored and prosecutorial power has been
curtailed.... The Booker decision restores judicial discretion, a key component of sentencing
that has been absent for the last twenty years.").
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D. Post-Booker Cultural Defense Analysis-United States v. Ruiz-Alonso
The first and only cultural defense case to be heard at the federal appeals level
since Booker is United States v. Ruiz-Alonso.169 In this illegal re-entry case, the gov-
ernment appealed a district court's decision at sentencing to "downward depart" four
levels based upon a variety of factors, in particular cultural assimilation. 70 The
defendant sought to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the government failed to dem-
onstrate that it had "'the personal approval of the Attorney General, the Solicitor
General, or a deputy solicitor general designated by the Solicitor General"' to proceed
with the appeal. 7' The Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant's argument, holding
that "the government's timely and properly filed notice of appeal" gave the court
jurisdiction, which was not "defeated by the government's failure to obtain approval
[under] 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b).' 72 The court then briefly turned to the downward depar-
ture and ruled without further explanation that, in light of the discretionary nature
of the Guidelines post-Booker and the new "reasonableness" standard, the sentence
must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing1 73 Although the jurisdic-
tional aspect of this case and its application of Booker have been cited in multiple cir-
cuit court cases, 74 no court has yet responded to the cultural defense aspect of this
case. Therefore, although this post-Booker cultural defense case does exist, its impact
is relatively minute.
CONCLUSION
There is no question that the highly formalized Guidelines system allowed little
room for judicial discretion in sentencing decisions prior to Booker. As discussed
above, each detail of the crime and prior conviction of the offender was accounted
for in the sentencing structure. Because of this rigidity, Congress, through the Federal
Sentencing Commission, allowed federal district judges a bit of discretion though
the so-called "catch all" provision in section 5K2.0 of the Guidelines. 75 An argument
could also be raised that Congress was purposefully vague in its language in certain
provisions of the Guidelines. The relevant example is, of course, section 5H1.10,
which prohibits the consideration of "Race, Sex, National Origin, Creed, Religion,
and Socio-Economic Status," but does not specifically address the term "culture."'' 76
169 397 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2005).
"0 Id. at 817.
'"' Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b) (2000) (outlining the reasons for and the restrictions
on government sentencing appeals)).
'72 Id. at 820.
173 id.
14 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 428 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 2005).
171 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (2004).
176 Id. § 5Hl.10.
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A simple reading of the text of the provision, as well as an examination of the pur-
pose of the Guidelines, clearly suggests that Congress had no intention of allowing
a cultural consideration.
Federal courts, however, have not read this provision uniformly. Three federal
circuits have explicitly ruled it to be an unlawful consideration in sentencing, 7 7 and
three others have ruled against its use in particular cases while expressly declining
to rule on whether culture could ever be considered in sentencing. 178 Despite this split
in the circuits, the Supreme Court has never taken up the issue and has therefore
allowed a degree of discretion to the district court judges in this area. The recent
Booker decision, however, has significantly broadened defense attorneys' oppor-
tunities to make cultural arguments in sentencing. Because the Court rendered the
Guidelines merely advisory, rather than mandatory, judges may now consider what-
ever relevant factors the attorneys bring forth in sentencing, regardless of the inter-
pretation of section 5H1.10. In this post-Booker world where judicial discretion is
subject only to a test of "reasonableness," it is necessary that the federal government
take action to prohibit federal judges from accepting the cultural defense and sentenc-
ing defendants differently based upon their cultural backgrounds.
As with many important issues of policy, there are essentially two routes by
which the use of the cultural defense could be prohibited: judicial action or congres-
sional action. Since the establishment of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and the U.S.
Sentencing Commission, major sentencing determinations have been made by the
courts. For example, it was left up to the courts to determine whether a defendant
could be sentenced longer than the statutory maximum authorized by conviction,' 79
and whether a jury's verdict authorized any sentence less than the statutory maxi-
mum.180 It was also the courts that ruled that the congressionally created Guidelines
were no longer mandatory.'8 ' It would seem at first glance, therefore, that the court
system is the more obvious venue for reform. 82 However, now that the Guidelines
system is no longer mandatory and individual judges are at liberty to alter sentences
based upon characteristics of the defendant, it is in the interest of thejudiciary to main-
tain the current system. It is therefore necessary for Congress, through the Sentencing
177 See United States v. Contreras, 180 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
904 (1999); United States v. Sprei, 145 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Natal-Rivera,
879 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1989).
178 See United States v. Guzman, 236 F.3d 830 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Tomono,
143 F.3d 1401 (11 th Cir. 1998); United States v. Yu, 954 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 1048 (1993).
179 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
80 Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
181 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
182 For an interesting discussion of the interplay between Congress and the courts in fed-
eral sentencing and of the possible responses by both branches after Booker, see Green, supra
note 4, at 424.
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Commission, to step in and clarify vague provisions in the Guidelines, such as section
5H 1.10, or pass legislation specifically outlawing the defense.
In November 2004, in anticipation of the Booker decision, criminal law experts
presented four options for revised sentencing regimes to the Sentencing Commission
in the event that the mandatory Guidelines were found to be unconstitutional.'83
Because it is most likely that Congress and the Sentencing Commission will address
the issues surrounding the cultural defense within a larger sentencing reform, each
of these four proposals will be presented with their likely effect on the cultural defense.
One suggestion that was raised for post-Booker Congressional Guideline reform
is the so-called "topless" Guideline structure.'4 Under this system, the Guidelines
could be restructured to require only a minimum sentence for each offense level.' 85
For example, a bank robbery, which would have had a pre-Booker sentence range of
forty-one to fifty-one months, would now have a "minimum sentence" of forty-one
months.8 6 This approach would alleviate the possibility of defendant-sympathetic
judges sentencing defendants to unusually low sentences based upon their cultural
background, while allowing judges to sentence at the statutory minimum where they
deem appropriate. This system also "preserve[s] the traditional role of judges and
juries in a way that a plan that submits sentencing facts to juries does not."'817 Although
this system would meet both goals of allowing for judicial discretion and promoting
more even sentencing, it has been argued that it could create harsher sentences for the
defendant than the pre-Booker system.'
The second proposal that the Sentencing Commission received, which seems to
be favored by the Commission and most practitioners, is what has been called the
"Blakelyization" Plan. 89 This plan would "convert[ ] the bases for the most frequently
used guidelines adjustments (such as... role in the offense [and drug amounts]), into
facts to be found by juries beyond a reasonable doubt.' 'l g° The most notable problem
raised by this plan is that it would require bifurcated jury trials on issues of guilt and
sentencing, thus decreasing the efficiency of the federal criminal courts.19' As applied
'8' Anello & Peikin, supra note 1, at 42.
'84 Id. at 43-44.
185 Id. at 43.
186 Green, supra note 4, at 423-24.
187 Anello & Peikin, supra note 1, at 44.
188 Green, supra note 4, at 424.
'89 Anello & Peikin, supra note 1, at 44-45; see also Klein, supra note 164, at 738-39 ("I
suggested in my testimony before the U.S. Sentencing Commission that Congress or the
Commission replace the present 258 box grid (based upon six criminal history categories and
forty-three offense levels) with ten offense levels, retaining the same zero to life spread by
increasing the judicial discretionary range within each grid from 25-40%. This shifts some
fact-finding authority back to juries and retains some judicial discretion.").
'9 Anello & Peikin, supra note 1, at 44-45.
'9' Id. at 45. An interesting report on the "Blakelyization" Plan appeared in The Seattle Times
on January 12, 2005. Id.; see also Peter Lewis, Scoring May Raise Movers' Sentences,
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to the cultural defense, this plan could take two paths: first, the courts could follow
the lead of the Tenth, Second, and Eighth Circuits which have ruled that the cultural
defense cannot be considered; 192 second, the courts could follow the Seventh, Eleventh,
and Third Circuits, and allow cultural issues to be submitted to juries for sentencing
purposes.193 If the second proposal is followed, the "Blakelyization" plan could lead
to the regular implementation of the cultural defense in federal sentencing.
The third plan submitted to the Commission, which did not receive much support
by the Commission, was to apply the Guidelines in an advisory nature, as they are cur-
rently, post-Booker.' 94 As discussed above, this plan gives a great deal of flexibility
to judges in looking at individual factors, such as culture, in making sentencing de-
terminations, and is therefore the favored option of federal judges. 95 In the relevant
context of limiting the cultural defense, this status quo option is the most dangerous
because of the increased discretion available to the judges in making sentencing
determinations.
Finally, the Commission received a proposal known as the "Upside Down
Guidelines Plan," which also garnered little support from the Sentencing Commis-
sion.196 In this system, "courts start their analysis with the harshest possible sentence,
and work their way down until a final sentence is reached [through] across-the-board
conversion of aggravating factors into mitigating factors that would be treated like
SEArrLE TIMEs, Jan. 12, 2005, at B 1. The District Court in Western Washington relied on
a Blakelyization-type approach in the conviction of three Israeli defendants in a fraud case
involving household-moving customers. Anello & Peikin, supra note 1, at 45. In this case,
"the jury spent seven hours deliberating 17 specific questions [of] factual issues" that would
affect the defendants' sentences. Id.
19' United States v. Contreras, 180 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 904
(1999); United States v. Sprei, 145 F.3d 528 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Natal-Rivera,
879 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1989).
'9' United States v. Guzman, 236 F.3d 830 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Tomono, 143
F.3d 1401 (11 th Cir. 1998); United States v. Yu, 954 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 1048 (1992).
194 Anello & Peikin, supra note 1, at 45-46.
'9' "The Judicial Conference of the United States," the principle policy-making body for
the federal court system, "'urged Congress to take no immediate legislative action to alter the
federal sentencing system in the wake of the Supreme Court ruling limiting the Sentencing
Guidelines to an advisory role."' Klein, supra note 164, at 738 (quoting Posting of Lyle
Deniston to SCOTUSblog (March 15, 2005, 13:28 EST), http://www.scotusblog.com/
movabletype/archives/ 2005/03/chief.justice i.html). The Conference stated in its March 15,
2005, report that "'it would oppose any legislation that would respond to the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Booker/United States v. Fanfan by raising directly the
upper limit of each sentencing Guideline range or expand the use of mandatory minimum
sentences."' Id. (quoting News Release, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Conference
Calls Off-Site Security for Judges Top Priority (March 15, 2005), available at http://www
.uscourts.gov/ttb/mar05ttb/security).
196 Anello & Peikin, supra note 1, at 45-46.
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affirmative defenses to the maximum sentence."'' 97 Here, the application of the cul-
tural defense is much the same as it was with the "Blakelyization" plan. If the cultural
defense is allowed to become a mitigating factor, its application will likely increase
rapidly in the federal system. If courts follow the circuits that prohibit the defense,
and the defense is not considered an appropriate mitigating factor, however, the cul-
tural defense will essentially be prohibited.
The fate of the cultural defense therefore lies essentially within the fate of the
Guidelines. If the current post-Booker system stays in place, the significant amount
of judicial discretion will undoubtedly allow for the expansion of the cultural defense.
In this scenario, it would be necessary for the cultural defense to be specifically out-
lawed, either by a decision by the Supreme Court resolving the circuit split or by
legislative action by Congress. Similarly, if the "Blakelyization" Plan or the "Upside
Down Guidelines Plan" is selected as the appropriate remedy, the prohibition of the
cultural defense under section 5H1.10, or its functional equivalent, must be clarified.
,The Sentencing Commission should address this when it determines the sentencing
factors to be sent to the jury (in the "Blakelyization" Plan) or the mitigating circum-
stances to lessen the sentence (in the "Upside Down Guidelines Plan"). The strongest
move in favor of the prohibition of the cultural defense, and the one favored by the
Attorney General,'98 is the "topless" Guideline system. With the imposition of the
mandatory minimum sentences for all federal crimes, the great disparity in sentences
involving "cultural" factors would be significantly lessened.
Faced with these four proposals, the time is ripe for the Sentencing Commission
to take action. As one commentator suggested,
"If a fundamental reconfiguration of federal sentencing structures
is to occur, someone or some institution outside of Congress, the
Justice Department, and the robed judiciary will have to take the
lead in formulating and advancing it. Congress lacks the expertise
for the job. DOJ has the expertise, but not the motivation. The
judges don't do legislation. Institutionally, that leaves the Sentenc-
ing Commission. One of the most puzzling features of the post-
Booker landscape is the absence of the Commission as anything
other than a gatherer of data. The Commission has the time, the
expertise, the data, and (one would think) the motivation to take
a leading role in molding thinking about where we should go
from here."99
197 id.
198 Id. at 53. On June 21, 2005, Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez, who had previously
"been silent on the issue... [publicly] opposed the current system, stating that the 'advisory
guidelines system we currently have can and must be improved."' Id. He also explicitly came
out in favor of the construction of a minimum guideline system. Id.
199 Jordan, supra note 168, at 673-74 (quoting Douglas Berman & Frank 0. Bowman III,
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